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Abstract 
 
The European Union is one of the world’s most important actors in assisting fragile and 
conflict-affected countries, and has made engagement with ‘fragile states’ a top priority 
for its development policy. At the policy level, the EU’s approach is in line with international 
best practices defined by the OECD’s 2007 Principles and the 2011 Busan ‘New Deal’ for 
fragile states. At the operational level, the EU is developing a ‘comprehensive approach’ to 
the implementation of its policies. As is the case with most international actors that engage 
with fragile and conflict-affected countries, a multidimensional gap exists between the 
intentions expressed at the policy level and the reality of operations at the country level. 
This paper argues that three sets of factors intervene between the policy and the operations 
level: cognitive factors related to turning knowledge of partner-country political processes 
into appropriate actions; issue-related conflicts of interest and trade-offs; and actor-related 
factors concerning coordination and capacity. This paper discusses how these factors 
affect the implementation of the EU’s policy frameworks with reference to three fragile 
and conflict-affected countries: South Sudan, Nepal and Liberia. 
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1 Introduction 
In recent years, the international development community has become more focussed on 
fragile and conflict-affected (FCA) countries, which face greater obstacles to setting their 
development on a sustainable path than more peaceful countries. As overall global poverty 
falls, countries where violent conflict, high levels of violent crime, and weak public 
institutions are prevalent remain at the bottom of global development league tables 
(Collier 2009, World Bank 2011).1 Since about 2000, a consensus on the broad principles 
of engagement with FCA countries has been emerging. Engagement needs to be 
conceptually holistic in terms of policy objectives, comprehensive in terms of instruments 
deployed, and more specifically tailored to the individual case than policy towards more 
politically stable developing countries (USAID 2005, ERD 2009, World Bank 2011, 
DFID 2011, OECD 2011a). However, despite the gravity of the problem, its apparent 
urgency, and the emerging consensus on what should be done, a multidimensional gap 
between the theory and practice of engagement with FCA countries has been widely noted 
(Chandler 2007, ERD 2009, OECD 2011 b, Faust / Grävingholt / Ziaja 2013). 
The prominence of fragile states in EU development policy discourse has also risen in 
recent years. Recent reforms to the EU’s external policy bureaucracy under the Lisbon 
Treaty have brought security and development policy together under one roof in the 
European External Action Service (EEAS), for which FCA countries are becoming a core 
area of activity. The EU attaches a high priority to fragile states for several reasons: many 
Europeans feel that their countries and the EU institutions have a moral responsibility to 
support people living in vulnerable countries, to prevent conflict and to promote good 
governance, and such feelings have sharpened as the development success of stable 
countries has left the poorest FCA countries behind. Fragile states are also important to 
Europe from an instrumentalist perspective: in Africa especially, engagements in 
peacekeeping, peacebuilding and statebuilding processes are considered to be in Europe’s 
strategic interest for reasons of geographical proximity as well as the rising geopolitical 
and economic importance of the continent (European Commission 2007). 
From a development aid perspective, it is likely that ‘traditional’ European Union aid 
programmes aimed at reducing poverty will be less focussed on stable countries, many of 
which are reaching ‘middle income’ status (Koch 2012). The EU – meaning, for the 
purposes of this paper, the Commission, the EEAS and the delegations as opposed to 
member states’ bilateral engagements – has significant potential to make a positive 
difference in fragile states and situations. The EU’s seven-year budget cycle provides a 
longer timeframe than member state agencies often enjoy, which is important in 
engagements where patience is required, even if the political pressure to show progress is 
often intense. The many policies and instruments it has at its disposal: humanitarian 
assistance, military and civilian crisis-response teams, basic service delivery, mediation, 
                                                 
1  The term ‘fragile state’ is contested to the extent that there is no universally accepted definition (Mata / 
Ziaja 2009). Some countries that are recovering from civil or international conflict, experiencing 
peacebuilding and statebuilding challenges, and/or score highly on fragility indexes, do not consider 
their state institutions to be ‘fragile.’ Examples include Ethiopia and Rwanda. Others, such those that 
have signed up for the New Deal (including the three case countries covered in this paper) have 
accepted the term. The term ‘post conflict’ is also widely used, but in many countries conflicts may not 
have ended even if a peace deal has been signed, violence has subsided and peacebuilding is underway. 
For this paper, ‘fragile and conflict-affected countries’ is preferred. 
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election monitoring, development aid including general and sector budget support, 
institution-building expertise, support for justice and reconciliation processes, governance 
support and economic policy instruments can all be used at different times and in different 
combinations to support a fragile country’s progression through the entire peacekee-
ping/peacebuilding/statebuilding process. The EU’s global presence enables it to learn 
from diverse experiences and keeps it engaged in some of the world’s hardest cases as 
‘donor of last resort.’ 
Against this background, this paper asks two research questions. These are analysed with 
reference to debates in research and policymaking circles about the principles, strategies 
and instruments the EU mobilises in FCA countries, and through a detailed look at EU 
engagement in three FCA countries: South Sudan, Nepal and Liberia. 
1. Are the EU’s objectives in line with international best practices when it comes to 
articulating its policy on engagement with fragile and conflict-affected countries?  
2. What kinds of challenges arise as policy is translated into operations at the 
country level, and how does the EU cope with these complex challenges? 
The paper is organised as follows. The next section provides an overview of the research 
and policy communities’ efforts to define the state fragility problem and establish 
guidelines for external engagement. Section 3 outlines the EU’s approach to FCA 
countries. Although the EU is a ‘norm taker’ rather than a ‘norm maker’ in this area, its 
policy-level approach is consistent with international best practices and has evolved in 
tune with the latest thinking. 
Section 4 discusses three distinct types of challenge that the EU (and other international 
actors) face in translating policy into operations at the country level: 
- First, cognitive challenges: While EU actors and officials are usually well 
informed about the political and economic challenges of the countries where they 
intervene and the conflicts they seek to help resolve, they face difficulties in 
translating this knowledge into action. This may result in technocratic approaches 
that do not sit well with political realities at the partner-country level; 
- Second, issue-related challenges: the EU faces conflicts of interest, such as short-
term economic interests versus the need for longer-term capacity building, political 
engagement versus developmental ‘neutrality,’ or the desire to promote democracy 
and the need to preserve stability. Resolving these requires making trade-offs, and 
the EU prefers the risk-averse approach of avoiding these rather than facing them 
head-on; 
- Third, system-related challenges: European responses are often poorly coordinated 
at the country level, both with regard to coordination among EU and member state 
actors and the wider donor community, and with regard to the EU’s engagement 
with partner-country governments and systems. This is particularly problematic in 
FCA countries, because country capacity, systems and political will are often too 
weak to push donors into improving coordination. 
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Section 5 examines EU engagement with three fragile and conflict-affected countries: 
South Sudan, Nepal and Liberia. The empirical analyses show that the three kinds of 
challenge are indeed ever-present. In general, EU officials at headquarters and in the 
delegations are aware of the three kinds of challenge, even if they do not necessarily 
conceptualise them in this way. They do their best to work through them pragmatically, 
taking advantage of opportunities as they arise. Nevertheless, the multidimensional policy-
operations gap cannot be closed easily, given the background political factors influencing 
the donor engagement, the framework conditions of the specific engagement and the 
interests and capacities of the actors involved. 
The final section draws conclusions about how the EU deals with the three challenges 
outlined in Section 4 and explored in the case studies. EU officials in Brussels and in the 
delegations are very well informed about the politics of the FCA countries they work with. 
They have not always been able to overcome several barriers to translating knowledge into 
effective operations. These include capacity constraints at the delegation level and some 
bureaucratic inertia on the EU side, both at the Brussels level and between EU and 
member state agencies. On the partner-country side, commitment to making EU 
programmes work has been inconsistent. 
With regard to conflicts of interest and trade-offs, these emerge at several levels: between 
the EU and partner countries, between EU actors at the country level, and between sectoral 
interests at the country level. The most difficult conflicts of interest are those between 
European ideas about how statebuilding should be done, and partner-country elite 
preferences for solidifying power. These conflicts of interest cannot always be resolved, 
meaning that satisfactory trade-offs are sometimes impossible. 
Finally, with regard to systemic factors, the EU and its member states have started to make 
improvements to sectoral coordination through joint programming, particularly in South 
Sudan. Member state and EU programmes are still not closely coordinated regarding aid 
allocations, budget cycles, programming, project duration, reporting and policy dialogue. 
At the country level, officials often lament the lack of coordination while recognising the 
limits to it. They get on with ad hoc coordination of programmes and projects and are 
often sceptical of externally imposed coordination mechanisms. Somewhat tautologically, 
there is a tendency to blame poor country-level coordination on the low capacity of 
partner-country systems. 
2 International development engagement with fragile and conflict-
affected countries 
Conceptually, discussions around international engagement in fragile and conflict-affected 
countries are linked to wider debates about when and where international intervention to 
resolve conflict is needed. There is a strong link between discourses on state fragility and 
human security discourses related to the Responsibility to Protect. There are also links 
with peacebuilding and statebuilding literature, drawing on ongoing theoretical and 
empirical debates about governance and democratisation and the capability of external 
actors to support, incentivise or ignore (Zulueta-Fülscher 2013). From a development-
research perspective, the question of how donors should engage with fragile states is 
framed by long-standing debates about the interdependence of security, humanitarian 
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intervention and development and the effectiveness of aid in conflict-affected countries 
(Duffield 2001; Howell / Lind 2009; Carment / Samy 2010). The conceptual debate has 
recently taken up questions of ‘resilience’ both as a means of coping with the 
consequences of fragility for populations and for ‘reducing’ fragility itself (Carpenter 
2012; de Weijer 2013a, EC 2013). 
Understanding fragility 
 
Figure 1:  Three dimensions of state fragility 
 
Source: Author’s own compilation 
Questions about how to define and measure state fragility, how to predict when a country 
will descend into violent conflict, and what kind of engagement can best help to resolve 
conflict and prevent its reoccurrence are currently receiving a lot of scholarly attention, 
and the policy sections of development and foreign ministries and international 
development agencies are taking note as they try to improve the effectiveness of their 
engagements. There is an emerging consensus among the research community that state 
fragility has three interlinked dimensions: authority, legitimacy and capacity (Stewart / 
Brown 2010; Carment / Samy 2011; Werther-Pietsch / Roithner 2011; Grävingholt / Ziaja 
/ Kreibaum 2012). These illustrate the multidimensional nature of state fragility and the 
fact that countries can perform better on one or two dimensions but remain seriously 
deficient elsewhere.2 
The first dimension is a state’s sovereign authority over the territory it controls. Fragile 
states are normally not in complete control over their territory, either because opposition 
groups or foreign powers control parts of it or because the state is too weak to prevent 
criminal gangs or local warlords acting with impunity in their local communities (Okumu / 
Ikelegbe 2010). The second dimension is the capacity of the state to deliver services to its 
                                                 
2 ‘ Fragility’ does not, of course, concern ‘the state’ only. Societal fragility, socio-economic 
marginalisation and inequality, and vulnerability to conflict go much deeper (Koehler et al. 2012, 
Kaplan 2013). The efforts of external actors in supporting the authority, capacity and legitimacy 
dimensions of the state and public institutions can help fragile and conflict-affected countries provide 
mechanisms for the often generational task of resolving – or at least learning to live with – deep societal 
tensions. 
Legitimacy: 
Consensus 
Accountability 
Justice
Capacity: 
Service delivery 
Equality of access 
Public goods provision 
Authority: 
Territorial control 
National defence 
Law and order 
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people. In the broader conceptual sense, state capacity can be seen as the ability to deliver 
public goods to all citizens regardless of social grouping. It is about equality of access to 
services, and equality of opportunity to benefit from citizenship (Stewart / Brown 2010: 
10). The third dimension is the state’s legitimacy in the eyes of its people: its ability to 
rule by consensus rather than by coercion. The legitimacy of a state is partly an outcome 
of its authority and capacity – it follows that a state that protects and serves its citizens 
without bias will be regarded by them as more legitimate than one which does not. 
Legitimacy is also partly derived from the extent to which ruling elites are accountable to 
their people in the democratic sense. This is often impossible in fragile states due to a lack 
of agreement about the legitimacy of the state itself: the core institutions that allocate 
political and economic power in a society (Faust 2010). 
The evolution of international best practice  
Recognition that the interlinked dimensions of fragility pose complex challenges has 
inspired several high-profile international efforts to define standards for engagement in 
fragile states and a policy ‘tool kit’ for supporting peacebuilding and statebuilding 
processes. Several recent studies and reports have been conducted or sponsored by the 
European Commission (EC), the United Nations (UN), the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID), the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) and 
the World Bank (WB), dealing with how to judge whether a state is fragile, how to design 
interventions, whether lessons can be learned that have wider applicability, and how best 
to monitor programmes, increase aid effectiveness and reduce the threat that poorly-
governed countries are perceived to pose to the West (USAID 2005, ERD 2009, DFID 
2011, OECD 2011a, World Bank 2011, UNDP 2012). 
Arguably, the most comprehensive and influential international efforts to define policy 
prescriptions and benchmarks for effective engagement in fragile and conflict-affected 
countries are those of the OECD. The OECD’s principles for good engagement in fragile 
states have been used as reference points by several of its members (OECD 2007).3 The 
OECD’s principles were, nevertheless, written by donors as a set of guidelines for donor 
engagements (Locke / Wyeth 2012). The role of FCA countries themselves in shaping the 
international process for defining principles and setting standards was formalised at the 
November 2011 Busan High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness. The self-selected G7+ 
group of fragile states and key development partners called for a ‘new deal’ for 
international engagement in fragile states. The document re-stated the importance of 
fragile states to the global development agenda and set out a practical, country-owned 
strategy for engagement based on three pillars: the peacebuilding and statebuilding goals, 
focussing on country-led solutions, and building mutual trust and strong partnerships.4 
                                                 
3  The OECD calls on international actors to observe 10 principles in fragile states: 2 basic principles (take 
context as the starting point and do no harm), 4 peacebuilding/statebuilding principles (focus on 
statebuilding; prioritise prevention; link political, security and development objectives; and promote 
non-discrimination) and 4 practicalities (align with local priorities; agree on practical coordination 
mechanisms; act fast but commit to long engagements; and avoid pockets of exclusion). 
4  See www.newdeal4peace.org. The New Deal has been welcomed by the international community, but 
several concerns have been expressed: that it risks imposing a framework that may become a 
straightjacket for processes that are supposed to reflect local contexts; that implementing the New Deal 
will require much more mutual trust between donors and recipient countries than has previously been 
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The New Deal has received a lot of attention among observers and policymakers. The 
World Bank announced in mid-2012 that its country strategies for fragile states would 
focus on the peace- and statebuilding goals. Although the New Deal did not receive more 
than a passing mention in the recent UN High-Level Panel Report on the Post-2015 
Development Agenda, the G7+’s contributions to international dialogue on peacebuilding, 
statebuilding and the security-development nexus have influenced discussions on the 
global development agenda to succeed the Millennium Development Goals from 2016 
(UN High-Level Panel 2013: 61). United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
Administrator Helen Clark has described the HLP Report’s recognition of the centrality of 
peace and good governance to the post-2015 global development agenda as a  
“possible paradigm shift in the way in which the international community could 
approach development” (Clark 2013). 
Taken together, these bilateral and multilateral initiatives, declarations of principle and 
official reports represent a comprehensive and growing body of knowledge and common 
sense to guide international engagement in FCA countries. Although the three dimensions 
of fragility have not yet been incorporated in official guidelines, these reflect an emerging 
normative framework for more coherent international engagement. Crucially, the official 
documents and guidelines represent an evolving consensus among donor, recipient and 
emerging countries that appears to have been arrived at in an amicable and consultative 
manner. The international community has recognised that fragile states require more 
financial and political investment; that while peacebuilding and statebuilding processes 
need to be supported, FCA countries need the decision-making space to resolve their own 
problems; that complex processes take time and international actors need to be there for 
the long haul; and that, because specific interventions may fail, expectations need to be 
managed. 
While some have noted that the increasing take-up of these principles by donors and 
partner countries is starting to be reflected in better aid effectiveness results (Chandy 
2011), scepticism that internationally agreed principles and guidelines are actually being 
implemented remains. In an assessment of the implementation of its own Principles, the 
OECD concluded that  
“performance… is seriously off-track. Overall, in the thirteen countries under review 
in 2011, international stakeholder engagement is partially or fully off-track for eight 
out of ten of the FSPs [Fragile States Principles]” (OECD 2011b: 11). 
3 The European approach to fragile and conflict-affected countries 
The EU does not drive the global fragile states agenda, but its policy frameworks have 
evolved in tune with international best practices. The EU has adopted the OECD’s 
definition of fragile states: 
“Fragile regions or states lack the ability to develop mutually constructive relations 
with society and often have a weak capacity to carry out basic governance functions.” 
(OECD 2012; EuropeAid 2013) 
                                                                                                                                                   
evident; and that, while emerging powers are officially involved in the Dialogue, they have not officially 
endorsed the New Deal (Locke / Wyeth 2012). 
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The EU can be described as a ‘norm taker’ rather than a ‘norm maker’ with regard to its 
engagement with FCA countries. The EU is not considered an intellectual leader on fragile 
states by the other major players. Rather, EU policy documents reflect internationally 
evolving principles, standards and codes of practice with a ‘European twist.’ The EU maps 
out the broad principles of its approach in a few key policy declarations: the 2003 
European Security Strategy included state fragility as one of the key security challenges 
facing Europe (European Council 2003); the 2005 European Consensus on Development 
included state fragility among the areas on which EU development cooperation should 
concentrate (European Union 2006); and the 2007 European Commission Communication 
on Fragility launched an intra-EU discussion aimed at building a comprehensive strategy 
for engagement with fragile states (European Commission 2007). The Communication 
was followed by two November 2007 Council Conclusions documents which set a number 
of objectives for the EU’s approach to the security-development nexus and its engagement 
in fragile states. The European Council expressed its intent to make coherent use of the 
many instruments at Europe’s disposal in a ‘whole-of-government approach,’ promoting 
democratic governance and strengthening the capability of partner states to fulfil their key 
functions (European Council 2007a and b). 
The EU’s policy objectives can be summed up as the following: 
- to support FCA countries through the whole peacekeeping, peacebuilding and 
statebuilding processes as preconditions for sustainable socio-economic 
development; 
- to support partners in achieving the peacebuilding and statebuilding goals 
articulated in the New Deal; 
- to hinder negative fall-out from conflicts that may present a security threat or 
humanitarian crisis for neighbouring countries and for the EU itself; 
- to implement a ‘comprehensive approach’ which makes use of all of the EU’s 
financial and institutional instruments to support partner countries’ transition; 
- to coordinate the activities of EU-level and member state actors at the country 
level as per commitments made in the 2005 EU Consensus and the 2007 Code of 
Conduct. 
These objectives reflect international principles and best practices, while aspiring to make 
the most of the EU’s perceived comparative advantages with regard to other international 
actors and its own member states. These include ‘hard’ advantages such as the EU’s size, 
global reach, technical expertise, and civilian, military, diplomatic, financial, economic 
and human resources; and ‘softer’ resources such the EU’s history as a peacebuilding 
project, its reputation as an honest broker without nefarious agendas, and its cultural and 
historical ties with many FCA countries. 
The 2009 Lisbon Treaty 
The 2009 Lisbon Treaty’s commitment to improve the coherence of EU external policies 
has particular significance for the EU’s engagement in FCA countries. The Treaty 
explicitly named peace, conflict prevention and strengthening international security as 
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objectives of the EU’s external policy.5 The Treaty also created the EEAS, which assumed 
responsibility for the EU’s international representation in January 2011. Managing 
security and development policy in fragile and conflict-affected countries has since 
become a central aspect of the Service’s work (EEAS 2013). Formally, the EEAS 
incorporates agencies responsible for implementing the EU’s Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), and its role in 
programming the EU’s development instruments have brought agents operating across the 
security-development nexus together under one roof (European Council 2010). Reforms to 
the Commission’s DG DevCo included the creation of the fragility and crisis management 
unit, which works closely with the EEAS’ development cooperation and conflict 
prevention units as well as with experts in DevCo’s EuropeAid units responsible for 
financing country programmes in fragile states and African Union (AU)-led operations 
through the African Peace Facility (interviews January 2013). 
As several analysts have noted, the post-Lisbon Treaty organisational and administrative 
structure has significant potential as a foundation for comprehensive approaches 
deploying the EU’s arsenal of foreign policy instruments (Berger / Humuza / Janssens 
2013, Furness 2013, Hellweg / Ivan / Kostanyan 2013). Cooperation has taken some time 
to bed in as the different organisations and individuals got used to their roles. The 
inclusion of responsibilities for development aid programming under the EEAS’ mandate 
has not always been welcomed or seen as an opportunity by diplomats more interested in 
the ‘high politics’ of foreign relations and security diplomacy. Generally, however, 
officials working in the EEAS units that deal with developing countries and regions are 
positive about progress at the Brussels level on the security-development nexus and fragile 
states. As one EEAS official remarked, “We are getting a broader idea of what 
development can do” (interview January 2013). 
The 2011 Agenda for Change 
The EU Commission’s ‘Agenda for Change’ policy statement, published in October 2011, 
outlined the overarching objectives for EU development cooperation for the next decade 
or so. The document proposed four main priorities: inclusive and sustainable growth; 
democracy and good governance; security-development and state fragility; and 
differentiation between partner countries at varying levels of development. The document 
stated that the Commission ‘should, in all regions, allocate more funds than in the past to 
the countries most in need, including fragile states’ (European Commission 2011a: 11). 
The Agenda’s provisions on engagement with fragile and conflict-affected countries 
followed the OECD guidelines closely:  
“In situations of fragility, specific forms of support should be defined to enable 
recovery and resilience, notably through close coordination with the international 
community and proper articulation with humanitarian activities. The aim should be to 
maximise national ownership both at state and local levels so as to secure stability 
and meet basic needs in the short term, while at the same time strengthening 
governance, capacity and economic growth, keeping state-building as a central 
element.” (Commission 2011 a: 10) 
                                                 
5  Article 21 (c) TEU. 
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Initiatives taken at the EU level in the context of the implementation of the Agenda for 
Change have further advanced the OECD Principles and the New Deal into EU policy on 
engagement with fragile and conflict-affected countries. When member states signed off 
on the Agenda at the May 2012 Foreign Affairs Council, they re-iterated the international 
community’s guidelines: 
“The EU and its Member States shall pursue actions to implement the New Deal for 
engagement in fragile states, as set out in the Busan Partnership for Effective 
Development Co-operation.” (European Council 2012a: 3) 
A second Communication on the EU’s future approach to budget support proposed the 
development of ‘state-building contracts’ with fragile states (European Commission 
2011b: 6). For fragile states, state-building contracts were proposed as an innovative way 
of supporting capacity development in government agencies using budget support.6 The 
expectation is that using budget support in fragile situations will prove a useful incentive 
for partner governments to improve their performance against transparency and good 
governance indicators. 
The shelved fragility action plan 
In 2010, a draft EU Action Plan on Fragility was prepared based on experiences in six 
pilot countries: Burundi, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Timor-Leste and Yemen. 
The Action Plan was intended to clarify what role the EU level of Brussels institutions and 
EU delegations would have in relation to the EU’s member states, particularly those with 
large presences in FCA countries. It was also intended to define the EU’s role in relation 
to other actors, especially the UN, the World Bank and the United States. 
Discussion among member state ministries, the Commission and the EEAS on the Action 
Plan stalled in late 2010 and the Action Plan was shelved. Senior officials in DG DevCo 
and the EEAS were reportedly reluctant to commit to the text, and the political will to 
push it through dried up. Officials who had seen drafts confirmed that the Action Plan was 
not revolutionary, but stressed aid effectiveness in situations of fragility and suggested 
ways to simplify procedures (interviews January 2013). Its shelving nevertheless attracted 
criticism from experts who argued that Europe’s approach should be concretised into a 
unified strategy with clear political objectives, particularly in light of changes to EU 
external policy mandates and institutions brought about by the Lisbon Treaty (Castillejo 
2011, Görtz / Sheriff 2012). A recent study for the European Parliament argued that the 
EU could take a major step towards realising its potential if it could define its 
peacebuilding and statebuilding role more clearly: Europe’s overall objectives and the 
core areas in which the Commission and the EEAS delegations can add the most value 
(Gavas et al. 2013). 
The fact that the Fragility Action Plan draft was not publicly released did not prevent the 
responsible units and individuals in the EEAS, DG DevCo and the EU delegations from 
                                                 
6  Four eligibility criteria have to be satisfied: the existence of a national development strategy; a stability-
oriented macroeconomic framework; a credible programme to improve public financial management; 
and publicly available budget information. For state-building contracts, these criteria are not applied as 
strictly as for budget support programmes under ‘normal’ circumstances. State-building contracts also 
imply that budget support is conditional on performance and can be withdrawn. 
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incorporating its most relevant and sensible provisions into policy and operations 
(interviews January 2013). In late 2012, the Commission released a policy paper on 
supporting resilience in crisis-prone countries that details the EU’s policy frameworks for 
development cooperation focussing on peace and statebuilding, addressing climate change 
and disaster risk reduction, food security and disaster risk reduction (European 
Commission 2013). Some specific proposals made in the Action Plan draft, such as the 
establishment of an EU early warning mechanism to facilitate information sharing and 
preparedness, and the creation of a joint Commission/EEAS unit in charge of policy and 
operational support for security sector reform (SSR), were still being discussed two years 
after the draft was shelved (Keohane / Grant 2013). Several issues that arose in the context 
of the Fragility Action Plan remained in focus, as attention turned to the implementation 
level and the EU’s ‘Comprehensive Approach’ to peacebuilding and statebuilding. 
Linking the policy and operations levels: The EU’s ‘Comprehensive Approach’ to 
peacebuilding and statebuilding 
The ‘Comprehensive Approach’ is an expression of the EU’s long-held ambition to 
develop ‘whole-of-EU’ approaches to complex external relations challenges. In arguing 
for a greater international role, EU officials have often pointed out that one of the Union’s 
greatest added values is its ability to mobilise an array of instruments and capabilities that 
enable it to support partner countries (EEAS 2013). The Council Conclusions on the 
CSDP from July 2012 stated: 
“The Council looks forward to the development of a joint communication on the 
comprehensive approach by the European Commission and the High Representative. 
The Council underlines the importance of CSDP as an essential element for such a 
comprehensive approach.” (European Council 2012b) 
The term ‘comprehensive approach’ was not coined in EU development policymaking 
circles but has emerged from discussions on the integration of civilian and military 
components in the CSDP (Johannsen 2011, Wittkowsky / Pietz 2013). The effort to 
broaden the perspective from crisis response to engagement with the longer term political 
and economic factors that make conflicts hard to resolve has brought socio-economic 
development processes into focus. A further development is the conscious effort to raise 
capacities in areas in which the EU can provide concrete support to peace processes, such 
as through mediation. 
The ultimate goal of the comprehensive approach is to increase leverage across the EU’s 
instruments so that they add up to more than the sum of their parts. However, the legal and 
bureaucratic intricacies of the EU system are such that decision-making and 
implementation processes that govern the way actors use instruments vary, and 
responsibilities lie in different parts of the policymaking system.7 As Sherriff (2013) put 
                                                 
7  These include financial instruments: humanitarian aid, the CFSP instrument, the ATHENA instrument 
for financing military missions, the Instrument for Stability and Peace, and the longer-term development 
aid instruments which constitute the lion’s share of the EU’s external relations budget. They also include 
the various EU-level actors who may become involved in an engagement: DG ECHO, the CSDP civilian 
crisis management structures and the EU military staff, the EU Special Representatives, the EEAS’ 
policy units and regional and country desks, policy units in DG DevCo and DG Enlargement 
Neighbourhood, and many of the EU’s global network of 139 delegations are directly or indirectly 
involved in supporting fragile and conflict-affected countries. 
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it: “Ask 10 people from across the EU institutions to define the comprehensive approach 
and chances are you’ll get 10 different answers.” A widely held view in Brussels is that 
clearer guidelines on how and when to use each instrument as an engagement proceeds 
would help actors better understand their roles and thus reduce the temptation to engage in 
turf wars (interviews January 2013). 
A joint communication defining the EU’s ‘Comprehensive Approach to Peacebuilding and 
Statebuilding’ was to have been released in mid-2013, but was delayed, reportedly for the 
same reasons as the Fragility Action Plan (interviews June 2013). In December 2013, the 
Commission and the High Representative released their Joint Communication on ‘the 
EU’s comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises.’ This document provided a 
set of eight measures to enhance the coherence and effectiveness of EU policy in response 
to conflict and crises, but stopped short of outlining a comprehensive blueprint for 
supporting the entire peacekeeping/peacebuilding/statebuilding process. The 
Communication pledges to improve the EU’s capacity for analysis and conflict prevention 
in the first instance. In cases where conflicts turn violent, the EU should mobilise its 
various strengths and capacities, commit to long-term engagements, and take care to iron 
out potential incoherencies in its approach. The potential of the EU delegations for 
coordinating EU and member state activities at the country level is stressed and the 
comprehensive approach is linked to the EU’s emerging joint programming exercises. 
Cooperation with other European and non-European actors is prioritised also. The 
document is vague on one contentious issue, namely the need for ‘a common strategic 
vision’ shared by the EU institutions and member states (European Commission / HR 
2013). 
The Comprehensive Approach process is intended to provide important guidelines for 
policy design and implementation at the country level. In early 2012, EEAS, DG DevCo, 
DG ECHO and some delegation officials started work on policy guidelines for the use of 
financial and operational instruments, and developing conceptual tools (such as ‘conflict 
assessment tools’ and early warning systems) which can be mainstreamed into 
programming (interviews January 2013). These guidance notes were released publicly in 
November 2013. The instruments guidance note lists key questions that EU officials need 
to ask themselves when planning an intervention and stresses the need for in-depth 
information about conflict dynamics. A useful list of typical peacebuilding challenges that 
often require external support is provided. The document is candid about some of the 
obstacles that the EU faces in using its instruments, such as the limited time-scale of 
Instrument for Stability and Peace actions and the legal restrictions that the EU Treaties 
impose on supporting measures that have military implications.8 
The EU delegations 
The EU delegations are key actors in translating the EU’s policy-level initiatives towards 
FCA countries into operations, and ultimately into outcomes at the country level. The 
European Commission has active development programmes in 43 countries classified by 
DFID as ‘fragile’ (House of Commons IDC 2012) and spends almost half of its aid budget 
in these countries (EuropeAid 2013). 
                                                 
8  See www.capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu. 
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Following the Lisbon Treaty, the political mandate and logistical capacities of EU 
delegations have been increased, with the intention of lifting the EU’s profile at the 
country level, both with the partner government and with regard to member state bilateral 
missions. The rather slim provisions on the delegations in the Lisbon Treaty (Article 221 
TFEU) were given more substance by the July 2010 Council Decision on the EEAS 
(European Council 2010). Since then, the details of the delegation’s enhanced roles have 
slowly become more defined. EU officials point out that, while the transition process is 
mostly technical, the technicalities are ‘non-neutral’ and at times involve difficult learning 
processes (interviews January 2013). One example of this is in the relationship between 
the delegations’ operations and political sections. As a general rule, most operations 
section staff are Commission officials, many of whom have long experience in traditional 
development cooperation with its strong poverty eradication focus. Most are aware that 
their work cannot be apolitical, but some struggle with the more politicised role that the 
delegations are now expected to carry out. On the other hand, political section staff are 
usually EEAS officials with backgrounds in member state diplomatic services, the Council 
Secretariat or the former Commission DG RELEX. They do not always have in-depth 
understanding of development objectives and processes. In most cases, the individuals 
involved are aware of the potential for misunderstanding and open to learning from their 
colleagues. Nevertheless, the creation of political sections in the delegations has 
reportedly created tensions in some cases, particularly as the delegations’ roles have 
increasingly included enhanced policy dialogue with partner countries (interviews 
January, February and April 2013). 
The delegations’ role in FCA countries has several dimensions: at the policy level they 
have a formal function in preparing the EU’s multiannual country strategies and annual 
programming. The delegation’s country knowledge and interactions with partner-country 
governments, other donor organisations and civil-society actors feed back into decisions 
taken in Brussels about which sectors to focus on, what kind of instruments to use (for 
example whether to focus more on projects, contribute to trust funds, or use more budget 
support), and who to cooperate with. At the implementation level, the delegations have 
several functions: an incomplete list includes diplomatic representative of the EU, central 
coordinating platform for EU member states present in a particular country through the 
Heads of Mission (EU HOMs) meetings, participant in sector working groups, planner of 
EU-financed project implementation, overseer of individual programmes and projects, and 
interlocutor with international and local civil society (Hayes 2013). In order to properly 
perform these diverse roles, the delegations need to work through several challenges that 
intervene between the policy and the implementation level. Three types of challenge that 
pose particular hurdles in FCA countries are outlined in the next section and examined in 
more detail in the case studies below. 
4 The operations level: three common challenges for translating policy 
into practice 
FCA countries are difficult places to work and best intentions can easily be set aside when 
things go wrong or circumstances change due to political or economic shocks, or even the 
effects of a natural disaster. Things can also go wrong because changes do not happen 
quickly enough, conflicting groups are unable to work together, or because powerful 
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people take advantage of weak institutions to further narrow interests at the expense of 
everyone else. Accordingly, there is often a gap between what external actors, such as the 
UN, the EU, the World Bank, and bilateral actors such as the United States (US), the 
United Kingdom (UK), France, Germany, Japan, Canada and Australia, promise in their 
policy declarations and strategy papers and the practice of designing and implementing 
complex interventions and support programmes. 
 
Figure 2. Three challenges for translating policy into practice 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s own compilation 
The peacebuilding and statebuilding literature debates several explanations for the policy-
operations gap. These explanations can be grouped into three general categories: cognitive 
explanations around the availability, processing and use of knowledge and information; 
issue-related explanations that highlight conflicts of interest and difficult trade-offs; and 
system-oriented explanations that focus on actor capability and the challenges of working 
together. Although these categories overlap and are mutually reinforcing, they are also 
conceptually distinct and can be discussed in turn (Page 2008). These challenges arise in 
varying degrees with most development engagements and are not specific to fragile states. 
They are, however, sharper and arguably more difficult to resolve in FCA countries. 
Cognitive challenges: translating knowledge into action 
The OECD’s Principles and the New Deal Peacebuilding and Statebuilding goals clearly 
state that external actors need to have a deep understanding of an FCA country’s politics if 
their engagements are to be effective. Every fragile country faces a unique set of 
challenges and vulnerabilities, and every engagement involves hundreds of decisions 
about objectives, design, implementation and monitoring, most of which are affected by 
context. Contexts are invariably highly complex, especially outside capital cities and other 
urban areas where the state’s presence tends to be replaced by other types of institutional 
organisation (De Weijer 2013b). 
It is often argued that international actors lack sufficient specific, detailed understanding 
of the political situation or context in the countries where they intervene (Hout 2010; 
Allouche / Lind 2013). Poor understanding of conflict is perhaps a symptom of a wider 
issue in development policy circles, where many mainstream debates are still framed in 
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apolitical terms (Unsworth 2009), or even that aid agencies deliberately ignore the 
political dimension in a vain search for ‘politically neutral’ forms of engagement 
(Carothers / De Gramont 2013). When attempts are made to get to the roots of the fragility 
issue, disagreements about the nature of the problem – and what to do about it – 
sometimes emerge (Faust / Grävingholt / Ziaja 2013). Inadequate or inaccurate knowledge 
can also stem from poor quality data, especially on governance indicators when key 
institutions operate informally. Likewise, socio-economic data is often incomplete in 
countries where much of the economy operates underground. 
Often, the problem is not of knowing what to do, but rather of knowing how to do it. 
Indeed, for the major development organisations, the issue is not usually so much lack of 
information as the difficulty of processing and translating knowledge into good policy 
choices and effective programmes (Clark 2013). This can lead to efforts to impose 
inappropriate institutional models, technocratic approaches to political problems, activities 
that exacerbate conflict situations and programmes that cannot adapt to changing 
circumstances (Andrews 2013). Difficulties with retaining institutional memory can create 
problems when it comes to using knowledge, especially regarding complex processes with 
deep historical roots. 
A critique often levelled at the EU is that its approach is far from innovative – rather, the 
EU places overly heavy emphasis on technical aspects of governance such as public sector 
reform and public financial management (Hout 2010). Observers have suggested that the 
EU has been slow to react and to take up lessons learned by other international 
organisations, such as the OECD or the World Bank, on the need for better analysis of the 
causes of conflict and the question of how to move forward given the actors’ preferences 
and constraints (Collier 2009). 
Issue-related challenges: managing conflicts of interest and trade-offs 
International actors often experience conflicts of interest that can undermine engagements 
in fragile and post-conflict countries (Brinkerhoff 2009; Stewart / Brown 2010). These can 
manifest themselves in many ways, from direct conflicts between donor and partner-
country economic or security interests to more subtle trade-offs between macro-level 
donor objectives such as peace and democracy (Grimm / Leininger 2012). Conflicts of 
interest often manifest themselves as specific trade-offs such as choices between 
initiatives in particular sectors, which, when not managed carefully, can undermine 
peacebuilding and statebuilding objectives. Some trade-offs, such as that between helping 
those most in need and improving aid effectiveness, are multidimensional and extremely 
difficult to resolve satisfactorily (Bold / Collier / Zeitlin 2009). 
Perhaps the most significant trade-off that emerges from international engagement with 
FCA countries stems from the central importance of partner-country ownership of their 
own peacebuilding and statebuilding processes. The relationship is often tense, as can be 
seen in the difficulties between the international community and the Karzai government in 
Afghanistan or the Palestinian Authority in the Occupied Territories (Poggoda 2012). A 
partner government’s interest in entrenching its often fragile hold on power can clash with 
internationalist values, such as human rights or democratic governance. A partner-
country’s interests in building infrastructure or focussing on a given economic sector may 
not square with the economic interests of donors. In fragile states, it is likely that conflicts 
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of interest on the partner-country side will be significant, such as those between elites and 
general populations, or between different social groups which had often been on opposing 
sides during the civil war (Jung 2012). 
The partner government is the EU’s primary interlocutor in developing countries. 
Nevertheless, the nature of the authority, capacity and legitimacy challenges experienced 
in FCA countries necessitates that external actors work with non-governmental partners as 
well. Local civil society organisations (CSOs) take many forms and have many functions. 
CSOs can serve as a public sphere, especially in countries where illiteracy is widespread 
or the media is compromised. They can act as important interlocutors between the state 
and citizens, whether as conduits of information or providers of services. They can have a 
crucial function in legitimising government or donor activities. The EU’s official position 
is to work with and support civil-society actors for all of these reasons. But civil society 
comes in many forms, and not all of them are easy for Europeans to work with. Some 
civil-society actors defend values that are inimical to those promoted by the EU. 
Traditional African societies have long-established parallel governance structures, some of 
which are democratic and some of which rely on other systems, such as councils of elders 
or monarchical structures (Salih 2009: 154). In other cases, supporting CSOs can create 
problems with the government or the dominant elite, especially in less democratic settings. 
Also significant are trade-offs between European interests expressed as values or 
principles and the reality of country-level operations. EU officials consider that a real 
strength of the EU is that it does not have ‘other agendas,’ such as the commercial 
interests or postcolonial ties that some member states may have. There is no national 
agenda, as the EU’s 28+1 approach requires a common position to be formed, which is 
usually less politicised than those adopted by more unitary actors. The EU is, however, far 
from being a neutral actor, and its self-images of being both ‘above the fray’ and a ‘model 
for the rest of the world’ can manifest itself in a hectoring tone, which goes down badly 
with partners fully aware that the EU and its members are themselves far from perfect 
(Wallis 2011). 
System-related challenges: coordination and capacity 
The fact that many FCA countries are highly aid-dependent has raised questions about the 
effectiveness of aid and donor coordination in conflict-affected countries (OECD 2011a; 
Faust et al. 2013). Poor coordination is widely considered a problem at all stages of the 
process, from allocation and planning through to implementation at the country level. As 
Collier (2009) points out, donors have “attempted to address the difficulties of failing 
states piecemeal.” Coordination is arguably even more of an issue for the EU than for 
other donors, with the possible exception of the UN system. The EU must coordinate the 
activities of its constituent actors as well as engage in country-level coordination with 
other donors and with partner-country systems (Klingebiel et al. 2013). The complexity of 
the EU policymaking process sometimes reinforces inflexibility and Europe’s ability to 
coordinate itself and with others (Orbie / Versluys 2008; Molenaers / Nijs 2011). 
It has proved very difficult to make satisfactory progress on improving performance in this 
area. Many factors can undermine coordination, from a failure to appreciate the 
practicalities of implementing a programme that looked plausible on paper, to 
misunderstandings between headquarters and actors in the field, to time-lags caused by 
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decisions that must be taken by several organisations, to genuine differences of opinion 
about aspects of a policy or programme. Coordination can also fall victim to factors that 
are intrinsic to donors, such as siloing and turf wars between actors or even the different 
parts of a national or multilateral bureaucracy (Faust / Grävingholt / Ziaja 2013; Stepputat 
/ Greenwood 2013). The resulting aid fragmentation poses a particular challenge to weak 
partner-country institutions and governments who are faced with a plethora of 
international actors, some of whom may be pursuing agendas at odds with peacebuilding 
and statebuilding priorities. 
Poor coordination can also result from issues on the partner-country side, including poor 
capacity or lack of will (de Coning / Friis 2011), but also sometimes from the deliberate 
political decision to allow programmes to proceed in an uncoordinated manner. In some 
fragile countries, national development strategies are poorly articulated and it is hard for 
external actors to align with them. In other cases it is not clear which local actors to 
support, as many are by definition parties to the conflict. In other cases, the key factor is 
one of design, such as procurement procedures, coordination planning, the size of the 
budget, or monitoring. Often, key factors are ‘softer,’ such as the capability of the 
person(s) selected to manage a project, or the decision of a local leader to take part in a 
meeting. 
Capacity is by definition an issue for FCA countries. It is nevertheless often cited as a 
reason why policies are difficult to implement. The issue is somewhat tautological: 
international actors have to intervene to support FCA countries because of low state 
capacity, and then this same lack of capacity is blamed for implementation failures and 
delays. In fragile and conflict-affected countries this is often experienced as the absence of 
essential services, such as clean water, electricity, primary healthcare, and basic education. 
Where capacity and willingness are lacking, the international community’s core focus 
should be on building these so that the partner country can take responsibility as soon as 
possible. Country partners need to be part of the management of technical assistance from 
the beginning and this role should increase over time (Basler 2011: 4). However, the EU 
often implements projects through partners and agencies that it has little control over. 
Local actors have been unable to play a bigger role, and reliance on large international 
NGOs and trust funds has not helped state-capacity-building. 
5 The implementation level: EU engagement in 3 FCA countries 
This section discusses the EU’s engagement in three fragile and conflict-affected countries 
– South Sudan, Nepal and Liberia – with reference to the three explanations for the policy-
operations gap outlined above. 
The three case countries have been selected for four main reasons. First, they are all 
‘typical’ fragile states: low income, small(ish) countries recovering from serious violent 
conflict. All three countries have major fragility problems on all three dimensions: 
authority, legitimacy and capacity. Lessons can be therefore learned from these three cases 
that are likely to be applicable to peacebuilding and statebuilding engagements in similar 
FCA countries. Second, in all three countries a formal peace agreement is being 
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implemented with the assistance of the international community.9 The underlying conflicts 
remain present in all three countries and all will require international support for some 
time to address at times serious authority, capacity and legitimacy deficiencies. Third, the 
EU delegation has a prominent role in all three countries and the EU will most probably 
maintain country programmes in all three for the next decade at least. Fourth, there are 
contrasts between the EU-level and country-level framework conditions for the EU’s 
engagement in these three countries that make comparisons of how cognitive, issue-
related and system-related factors intervene between the policy and operations levels 
possible. 
5.1  South Sudan 
Background to the EU’s engagement 
The Republic of South Sudan seceded from Sudan in July 2011 after decades of civil war 
ended by the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). Two and a half years after 
independence, the domestic political, economic and security context for development in 
South Sudan remains extremely difficult. The Government of the Republic of South Sudan 
(GRSS), dominated by the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement (SPLM) has had the 
unenviable (and unique) task of building a country almost literally from scratch. During 
the 2005-2011 CPA period, the SPLM’s main focus was on achieving independence from 
the North rather than on preparing for life as a sovereign country. This emphasis is 
understandable, given that independence was never certain until Khartoum accepted the 
massive vote for independence in the January 2011 referendum. It nevertheless meant that 
                                                 
9  All countries have formal CPAs: either a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (Liberia and South Sudan) 
or a Comprehensive Peace Accord (Nepal). 
Table 1: South Sudan, Nepal and Liberia at a glance 
 South Sudan Nepal Liberia 
Independence 2011 1768 1847 
Most recent violent conflict 2nd Sudanese war 
1983 – 2005  
Nepalese civil war 
1996 – 2006  
2nd Liberian civil 
war 1999 – 2003  
Population (2013 est.) 11,090,104 30,430,267 3,989,703 
Life expectancy at birth 62 69 57 
Formal peace agreement 2005 2006 2003 
GDP/capita (2012) US $1,000 US $1,300 US $700 
Poverty % (nat. poverty line) 50.6 % 24.8 % 83.8 % 
World Bank IRAI score -  3.3 3.0 
HDI (rank) -  0.463 (157) 0.388 (174) 
ODA-GNI % (2011) 7% 4.7% 53.6% 
ODA per capita (2011) US $105 US $33 US $188 
Sources: UNDP 2013; 2011 IDA Resource Allocation Index; World Bank World Development Indi- 
 cators, Wikipedia Commons, CIA World Factbook 
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the SPLM devoted little space to thinking about the country’s longer term development 
priorities. Many things, from the provision of humanitarian aid, basic services and security 
to the drafting of the country’s national development strategy, were taken over by the 
international community (Morton 2013). 
From a security perspective, South Sudan is extremely fragile. Ongoing conflicts with the 
North mean that resumption of international war cannot be ruled out. Domestically, inter-
tribal tensions over land and livestock have flared into occasional violence, especially in 
Jonglei State. Politically, South Sudan is effectively a one-party state, but the SPLM is 
split by factions whose power-bases are built on regional and tribal loyalties (Stigant 
2013), raising fears that the country risks a dangerous conflict between its two largest 
ethnic minorities.10 According to UN officials in South Sudan, the international 
community does not have a contingency plan for the case that the SPLM splits along tribal 
lines (interviews February 2013). These fears proved well founded in mid-December 
2013, when the SPLM’s internal feuds turned violent and quickly escalated into a 
devastating civil conflict that levelled the towns of Bor and Malakai, reportedly killing 
more than ten thousand people and causing many hundreds of thousands to flee their 
homes and take refuge in UN compounds and neighbouring countries.11 A peace 
agreement between the rival factions was signed in Addis Ababa on 23 January 2014. 
Many observers have expressed scepticism that the country will be able to develop 
without lasting reconciliation between the rival factions and their tribal power-bases 
(interviews February 2013). 
The economic context to the EU’s engagement in South Sudan is defined by the long-
running dispute between Khartoum and Juba over the transportation of oil from wells in 
South Sudan to the tanker terminal at Port Sudan on the Red Sea. According to the South 
Sudan Ministry of Finance, oil revenues provided around 98 per cent of the GRSS’ 
budget, amounting to more than US $8 billion between the signing of the CPA and 
independence (Hamilton 2010). Following the GRSS’ decision to suspend oil exports in 
January 2012, South Sudan’s GDP fell by 52%, forcing the GRSS to suspend capital 
investments and implement an austerity package.12 The international community has 
invested heavily in supporting South Sudan’s long-term economic diversification through 
aid-funded programmes aimed at developing the country’s infrastructure and in particular 
its agricultural sector. 
                                                 
10 ‘South Sudan plunged into political crisis as president dissolves the government in power struggle,’ 
Independent, 24 July 2013. Political tensions between senior politicians – particularly President Salva 
Kiir Mayardit and Vice President Riek Machar, culminated in the sacking of Dr Machar, SPLM 
Secretary-General, Pagan Amum and several cabinet ministers on 23 July 2013. President Kiir is from 
the Dinka, South Sudan’s largest ethnic group; former Vice President Machar is from the second largest 
group, the Nuer. 
11  See David Smith ‘South Sudan: the death of a dream,’ Guardian, 20 January 2014; Nicholas Kulish 
‘Old Rivalries Reignited a Fuse in South Sudan,’ New York Times, 31 December 2013; Daniel Howden 
‘South Sudan: the state that fell apart in a week,’ Guardian, 22 December 2013. 
12 Sudan Tribune, 27 July 2013. South Sudan suspended oil exports following a dispute over transit fees. 
Following a deal brokered by the Chinese government and African Union mediator Thabo Mbeki, 
exports were partially resumed in the Spring of 2013 but the games have continued, with Khartoum 
accusing Juba of providing shelter and support to rebel groups active in Sudan’s southern provinces, and 
Juba claiming in turn that Khartoum has been backing rebels in South Sudan’s eastern Jonglei state. 
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In preparation for South Sudan’s independence, the EU upgraded its representation to a 
full delegation in May 2011 and inaugurated the European Union compound in Juba.13 In 
addition to the EU delegation, the UK, France, Germany, Italy, Denmark and Spain have 
representations in the compound, while Sweden has an office in another part of town. The 
EU’s engagement with South Sudan is based on the EU single-country strategy, which is 
aligned with the country’s 2011-2013 National Development Plan.14 The document 
identifies the principal sectors for EU and member state engagement as rule of law, health, 
education, infrastructure (mainly water and sanitation) and agriculture/food security. 
Several EU member states and ECHO are also committed to humanitarian assistance in 
South Sudan. All of the EU-level instruments, except military intervention, have been 
deployed in the country: an EU Special Representative for Sudan and South Sudan, the 
EUAVSEC CSDP mission at Juba international airport,15 Instrument-for-Stability 
financed initiatives, a large humanitarian assistance programme and European 
Development Fund (EDF)-financed programmes and projects. The EU’s response to the 
South Sudan crisis is likely, therefore, to be a real test for the Comprehensive Approach, 
which was articulated just as the violence escalated in December 2013 (European 
Commission / HR 2013). 
Cognitive factors: political analysis and engagement 
EU officials in Brussels and in Juba are very well informed about many aspects of South 
Sudan’s politics such as the internal conflicts in the SPLM and the dynamics of inter-tribal 
tensions. They are also well informed about the geopolitics of South Sudan’s relations 
with Sudan and the interests of the other big players – especially China and the US – in 
the country and its development. Information comes from several sources: the office of the 
EU Special Representative for Sudan and South Sudan provides intelligence on regional 
geopolitics. The upgrade to a full delegation has increased the EU’s capacity for political 
analysis and engagement at the ambassadorial level and through the delegation’s political 
section. Several expatriate staff, such as the head of the ECHO office in Juba, some 
member state officials, and member state implementation agency staff, have long country 
experience which has benefitted new arrivals. Prior to the outbreak of violence in 
December 2013, officials did not only spend their days in the EU compound but engaged 
actively in information gathering and exchange, both in Juba and in the regions. 
This does not mean that the EU delegation has always been able to translate knowledge 
into action. Some obstacles are structural: on the donor side, the Troika – the US, the UK 
and Norway – has been the main forum for political discussions with the SPLM. The 
Troika have seen themselves as ‘midwives’ for the new country and the US especially has 
significant leverage through instruments such as debt relief, as well as through the high-
                                                 
13  Previously the EU’s Juba office, which was opened in 2009, was a branch of the delegation in 
Khartoum. 
14  From an EU perspective the South Sudan joint strategy is a highly important document, as it is a pilot 
for joint programming of EU development cooperation through which the EU intends to organise 
division of labour at the country level. 
15  The airport security mission ended somewhat unsatisfactorily on 17 January 2014. The GRSS contract 
with a Chinese construction firm to build Juba’s new airport terminal was suspended in 2013 following 
the 2012 oil shutdown. The mission nevertheless claimed several successes, including the establishment 
of a civil aviation authority, improved capacities in the South Sudanese transport ministry, and improved 
security practices at the airport. See www.euavsec.eu. 
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level engagement of Secretary of State John Kerry. The UK has a long history in South 
Sudan, while Norway supported the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Army (SPLA) through the 
Sudanese civil war. Troika members have expressed openness to expanding membership 
to include the EU, but it is not clear whether this represents a sincere commitment 
(interviews February 2013).  
On the policy side, the EU’s experience in South Sudan between independence and the 
violent breakdown of December 2013 provided a telling example of how rapidly changing 
political and economic circumstances can upset the best-laid plans. The EU was able to 
react to shifting circumstances, somewhat ironically by (unofficially) shelving its own 
joint strategy. The EU Single Country Strategy is aligned with the GRSS’ August 2011 
National Development Plan, which was itself based on the assumption that oil revenues 
would boost public revenue and enable ambitious development projects. When the GRSS 
shut off oil exports in January 2012, EU officials were “amazed that they had shot 
themselves in the foot” (interviews February 2013). The GRSS cancelled the meeting in 
Juba at which the Single Country Strategy was to have been presented, and EU donors 
shifted their focus to assisting the GRSS through the ‘fiscal cliff’ they were expected to 
face when petrodollar reserves ran out. The EU Joint Strategy was left to stand, partly in 
the hope that the oil crisis would be short-lived, but also because of the risk that a de facto 
suspension of the joint programming exercise for a pilot country might have had for the 
whole EU process. But joint programming was hardly referred to in the wake of the oil 
suspension, principally because revising and re-ratifying it would have taken too long, but 
also because the systems supporting it were not established enough for it to be the go-to 
crisis management framework. The oil shut off did, however, provide the EU with a 
unique opportunity to get into serious dialogue about institutions, governance fiscal 
reform, and accountability, with the added leverage that the country’s increased aid 
dependence during the austerity period would provide (interviews February 2013). The 
tragic events of December and January 2014 have, of course, returned the EU’s focus on 
South Sudan to the country’s humanitarian crisis and efforts to achieve a ceasefire 
(European Council 2014). 
Issue-related factors: conflicts of interest and trade-offs 
The GRSS does not always do things the way that the EU and other international donors 
want them to. Although some country-level experts have questioned the commitment of 
elements of the GRSS to the task of building the state and developing the country 
(interviews January and February 2013), several factors stemming from the sheer 
magnitude of the GRSS’ task shape its preferences with regard to the EU and the wider 
donor community. The country has two linked, and yet distinct, political systems: the 
government in Juba and the state capitals; and the tribal system which is more important to 
most of the population. In order to balance these systems and keep the peace, governance 
is organised domestically in such a way that everyone gets something. Accordingly, 
clientelism has been the preferred means of organising public procurement and 
government jobs. Most senior government officials are former soldiers who are not used 
to dealing with donors, do not have the technical expertise to oversee complex 
programmes and projects, and do not want to negotiate on sensitive issues where the EU 
has strong interests like human rights and rule of law. Many experts believe that the 
SPLM does not see the need to build legitimacy through public services, as it considers 
that, after such a long war, merely having peace is sufficient for many people (interviews 
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February 2013). Much of the public anger directed at the highest levels of the SPLM since 
violent conflict erupted in mid-December 2013 directly challenges this elitist view. 
A stumbling block that may derail EU-GRSS relations is the GRSS’s non-ratification of 
the Cotonou Agreement due to its references to the International Criminal Court (ICC). 
GRSS officials have argued that, if they had to ratify the Rome Statute because of 
Cotonou, they would have to arrest Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir were he to land in 
Juba, and this would damage their relations with Sudan. A more likely reason is that some 
SPLA generals may also be of interest to the ICC. A further issue related to the Cotonou 
Agreement itself is that it would mean conditions and obligations that the South Sudanese 
would likely find onerous. Preparations for joint programming under the 2014-2020 EU 
budget have proceeded under the assumption that the EU delegation will be able to use the 
11th European Development Fund. If South Sudan does not ratify Cotonou, a different 
joint programming model, coordinated and financed bilaterally by the member states, will 
be needed. EU officials also believe that the delegation itself will be downsized if Cotonou 
is not signed, and the EU institutions’ country presence may be reduced to a primarily 
humanitarian aid focus (interviews February 2013). 
Systemic factors: coordination and capacity 
Until the tragic events that began in of December 2013 set the country back several years, 
South Sudan’s development landscape had favourable preconditions for donor 
coordination: although donor agencies have flooded in since independence, aid 
fragmentation is not considered to be as much of a problem as in many other countries 
where there are more donors with longer-established programmes, and large numbers of 
very small players doing ‘good works’. As the donor community in Juba has grown, a so-
called ‘G6’ has emerged, which includes the Troika plus the EU delegation, the UN 
Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and the World Bank. Other donors, including Canada, 
the UNDP, the African Development Bank (ADB) and some EU member states, join 
monthly meetings at various times, creating the ‘G6 plus’ and even the ‘G6 plus-plus’ 
configurations.16 There are several interconnected donor forums and an increasing number 
of meetings, although coordination between them has not been as structured as many 
officials would have liked (interviews January 2013). 
The international donor forums are linked to the South Sudanese aid architecture, but this 
is poorly developed. The GRSS’ efforts to coordinate donors are detailed in its November 
2011 Aid Strategy, aligned with the New Deal and the peacebuilding and statebuilding 
goals. This places heavy emphasis on GRSS ownership and donor use of country systems. 
The Strategy outlines the GRSS’ aid coordination mechanisms, starting with an 
international High-Level Partnership Forum, a country-level Quarterly Government-
Donor Forum, an Inter-Ministry Appraisal Committee and Sector Working Groups co-
chaired by the GRSS and a lead donor. These are underpinned by the Aid Information 
                                                 
16  Chinese presence in South Sudan increased between independence and the December 2013 crisis. 
Politically, China’s main priority is to foster peaceful relations between Khartoum and Juba. 
Economically, China has a strong interest in ensuring that South Sudanese oil is exported from Port 
Sudan in the North. The Chinese ambassador has been active in pursuing both objectives. The Chinese 
government and investment banks have not yet become involved in major public infrastructure projects 
in South Sudan to the same extent as in other African countries, but Chinese construction companies 
have been involved in building hotels, office blocks, warehouses and residential compounds. 
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Management System, a database to which all donors are supposed to provide information 
on their activities (Republic of South Sudan 2011). Prior to the December 2013 crisis, the 
aid architecture was said to be working better in some sectors than in others: health and 
education were generally considered to be working reasonably well, to the extent that the 
GRSS were meeting regularly with donors to discuss planning, budgeting, monitoring and 
evaluation. In the education sector, nearly 2 million South Sudanese children are in 
school, a six-fold increase since the CPA (interviews February 2013). Security and rule of 
law are said to be poor, where initial meetings have not been followed up. 
The EU has made a major effort to coordinate community and member state programmes 
through its joint programming exercise, but this has not, thus far, proved to be an effective 
coordination mechanism beyond information exchange. The EU delegation saw joint 
programming as an opportunity to demonstrate to the donor community and the GRSS the 
added value of the joint approach under EU leadership. Most EU member states, however, 
regarded it as an add-on to their bilateral engagement rather than as an overarching 
coordination mechanism. Some reportedly saw joint programming as a chance to get EU 
money to support bilateral programmes and agencies (interviews January and February 
2013). 
Poor capacity on the South Sudanese side is often cited as a reason why donor 
coordination has been patchy. Some officials argue that this is partly due to GRSS 
inability to use its potential leverage with donors strategically. Others question whether 
the GRSS has a strategy at all, and attribute this to the lack of unity within the government 
and the SPLM. As one official remarked, “the government wants to move carefully, to 
discuss some things with everyone, some things with no-one” (interviews February 2013). 
The country’s National Development Plan was not drawn up by the GRSS but by 
international consultants, resulting in contingent ownership. Administrative capacity is 
severely lacking, to the extent that many senior government officials lack computer skills 
and even basic literacy in some cases. Technical tasks in the ministries have been mostly 
carried out by international consultants financed by aid programmes. Some basic training 
courses for the staff of South Sudanese ministries and government agencies are available, 
but there is still a serious lack of IT training and other skills. These capacity deficits are, of 
course, likely to have been exacerbated massively by the tragic events of December 2013 
and January 2014. 
5.2 Nepal 
Background to the EU’s engagement 
Since the Comprehensive Peace Accord ended Nepal’s decade-long civil war in 2006, the 
peace process has progressed slowly, with successes interspersed by frequent setbacks. 
The declaration of a Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal in May 2008 ended 240 years 
of monarchy, but it did not resolve the deep-rooted ethnic and class conflicts that pushed 
the country into civil war. Nepal’s war was extremely serious, especially regarding its 
socio-political causes and consequences. It was, nevertheless, not as destructive as the 
conflicts in Liberia and between the two Sudans. Unlike in the Africa cases, Nepal 
emerged from the Maoist war with a functioning and professional civil service in 
Kathmandu which could partner the international community although, in the regions, 
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state capacity is much lower and more contested. Nepal is still a fragile country, 
vulnerable to internal political shocks, external economic shocks, food shortages in some 
regions and the potential effects of natural disasters. Although extreme poverty rates have 
fallen sharply since 2003, Nepal has one of the highest levels of economic inequality in 
Asia (World Bank 2013b). Economic growth since the CPA has been slow, limiting the 
‘peace dividend’ for ordinary people (Mallik 2012). 
The main statebuilding issues for Nepal arise from the country’s dysfunctional 
constitutional process. Nepal has held democratic elections and has managed to integrate 
the former Maoist rebels into the country’s mainstream politics. Consensus remains fragile 
and formal steps forward are frequently postponed, while public frustrations are aired in 
wildcat strikes and protests in Kathmandu and other cities. As noted by the EEAS, “A 
broad political consensus has not been achieved, nor has an efficient implementation 
framework been put in place” (EEAS 2010: 6). Nepal’s constitution-building process has 
come up against major divisions over the organisation of decentralisation and federalism. 
Political parties and organised social groups have not been able to reach agreement on 
several contentious issues, including the basis for federalism (whether states should be 
organised along ethnic, geographical or economic viability lines), and the type of electoral 
system (Hachhethu 2009).17 
The EU opened a full delegation to Nepal in 2010. Its 2007-2013 country strategy 
allocates US €120 million in aid to Nepal. It is likely that the EU will allocate more aid to 
Nepal under the next EU budget in accordance with the Agenda for Change’s intention to 
focus more on poor and fragile countries and end aid programmes to middle income 
countries, especially in Asia and Latin America. The EU delegation is involved in three 
sectors: education, peacebuilding and economic cooperation. Most of the EU’s aid is 
disbursed through two large programmes – a contribution to the Nepal Peacebuilding 
Trust Fund (NPTF) and an education budget support programme. The delegation is also 
responsible for overseeing a large number of smaller projects, mostly related to 
governance in the peacebuilding sector. Efforts in the economic sector, dubbed ‘trade,’ 
focus on integrating Nepal into the international community. Nepalese observers have 
recognised the EU’s major contribution and praised the EU’s constructive interventions in 
support of conflict resolution, democracy, rule of law and human rights (Hachhethu 2009). 
The EU deployed 120 observers for the constitutional assembly elections in 2008 and has 
subsequently supported the constitution-building process. The EU delegation in Nepal has 
been regarded as a model for EU engagement in other FCA countries (interviews March 
and April 2013). Although some voices criticise the EU for not pushing hard enough, its 
work in Nepal appears to be providing a positive contribution to change in the country 
without risking major reversals. 
Cognitive factors: political analysis and engagement 
Lots of things happen in Nepal that surprise donors: the Maoists, for example, have 
become part of the system in ways that few Westerners expected. The failure to reach 
                                                 
17  The constitutional process has, nevertheless, been conducted in a reasonably civilised manner in 
comparison with other post-conflict countries. Even the wildcat strikes are well organised, with prior 
announcements that warn people to stay off the streets, and police assistance for striking groups and 
protestors. 
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agreement on the constitution in May 2012 was a watershed moment for many diplomats 
in Kathmandu, who realised only then the importance of the regions outside the capital 
(interviews March 2013). Nepali political parties have proved adept at giving different 
messages to the international community and to their own supporters, especially on issues 
like federalism, where donors were led to expect a deal even though elite political party 
members considered it unpalatable (interviews March 2013). These experiences have led 
to risk-averse behaviour on the part of donors who have tended to avoid areas where 
problems may arise, and rather pick easy to explain stories. According to some experts, 
this goes a long way towards explaining the tendency of many donors to prefer smaller 
projects in sensitive governance sectors, which are easier to focus and monitor, and affect 
less people if they have to be closed down (interviews March 2013). 
International embassies rely on information from local staff and look to hire the best and 
brightest available. The result is that most local staff are from the dominant Brahmin-
Chhetri caste. This does not, of course, necessarily mean that donor agencies are 
misinformed or misled about local issues involving indigenous or Dalit groups. Many 
local staff have chosen to work for foreign embassies and aid agencies precisely because 
they want to engage with these issues. But the background of foreign embassy and aid 
agency staff is widely considered to be an issue for their understanding of the country’s 
socio-political intricacies. As one (Western) interviewee remarked, “Nepalis with Harvard 
PhDs don’t speak local languages” (interviews March 2013). 
The EU delegation is, nevertheless, very well informed, including through its local staff. 
EU delegation staff say that the delegation’s resources have doubled since it opened in 
2010. One benefit of funding smaller projects in the governance sector is the information 
the delegation receives from implementing NGOs and local partners. The UN is a further 
source of information for the whole donor community, particularly regarding the impact of 
projects and programmes in regional areas. There is a lot of awareness of the sensitivity of 
key processes, such as voter registration (especially female), and it is clear from comments 
made by EU and other donor agency officials, and local experts, that the EU delegation 
and the wider European community have learned from some chastening experiences 
(interviews March 2013).  
Few Nepalis have a detailed understanding of the EU. For many people, the EU delegation 
is interchangeable with DFID, Germany’s GIZ (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale 
Zusammenarbeit) or even non-EU members Norway and Switzerland. One Nepali expert 
said that when many of his compatriots are asked about the EU they start to talk about the 
‘Scandinavians,’ which they take to include Norway, the UK and the Swiss, but not the 
United States , Japan and – interestingly enough – Germany, which is considered to be a 
major donor and often discussed separately from the ‘EU group.’18 Also included in the 
EU group are a large number of Scandinavian NGOs in Nepal – including Norwegian 
NGOs – which are active in most sectors (interviews March 2013). 
  
                                                 
18  Germany is widely considered to have refrained from joining the rest of the EU’s ‘radical agenda. ’It is 
probable that German contributions to the restoration of important historical sites in Nepal have had the 
unintended result of providing a buffer of legitimacy that has forestalled criticism by Nepali elites. 
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Issue-related factors: conflicts of interest and trade-offs 
Nepalese society is made up of more than 100 caste and ethnic groups.19 The ‘high-caste’ 
Brahmin/Chhetri groups have dominated the country for hundreds of years. Although 
most people recognise that society needs to become more inclusive, the ancient socio-
political structure is entrenched and unlikely to change rapidly. One NGO staffer 
remarked that “Nepalis are good at talking about inclusiveness, but walking the talk is 
different” (interviews March 2013). The leaders of the main political parties, officials in 
the bureaucracy, media and academia are virtually all Brahmin/Chhetri and have more in 
common with each other than they do with the rest of the population. The interim 
constitution requires that the civil service has quotas for people from lower caste 
backgrounds, but some organisations – including the national human rights commission – 
have been unable to fill their quotas. This deep-seated tension is reflected in the national 
debate about federalism: a deal is necessary for the conclusion of the constitutional 
process, but this requires agreement between the political parties and indigenous groups. 
The Nepali caste system has proved a minefield for the Europeans. The main conflict of 
interest for EU donors has arisen from their support for inclusiveness, indigenous groups 
and lower castes. There is a perception among some sectors of Nepali society, particularly 
the intelligentsia, that the EU has involved itself in issues that have created animosity and 
misunderstanding in certain communities. European calls to respect freedom of religion 
have been seized upon by right-wingers and EU donors have even been criticised in the 
press for ‘proselytising Christianity.’ Some Nepalese even blame the Europeans for the 
failure of the constitutional process, because promotion of inclusiveness led to disharmony 
that caused the process to founder on the federalism issue (interviews March 2013). 
Mistakes have certainly been made. The most high-profile recent example was the May 
2011 scandal when aid to the Nepal Federation of Indigenous Nationalities (NEFIN) was 
stopped after the umbrella organisation for 56 ethnic minority groups started using 
violence to enforce strikes. Nepali intellectuals accused donors of “implanting ethnic 
divides” and promoting rights but not responsibilities (interviews March 2013). DFID was 
the donor most caught up in the scandal, but the EU delegation, which had also been 
funding NEFIN indirectly, was also tainted. The European donors swiftly withdrew 
funding for NEFIN, but the accusation that ‘Europeans’ were fomenting conflict by trying 
to empower minorities stuck. 
The NEFIN scandal has led to more risk-averse behaviour with regard to social inclusion 
and caste issues. Donors have started to move away from a discussion of inclusiveness 
centred on ethnicity or class and started to talk in terms of wealth quintiles. EU delegation 
officials acknowledge that the NEFIN affair led to a realisation that a mixed approach is 
likely to be more successful. As one official said, “Maybe we’re a bit more sensitive to 
issues and we try to explain more what the EU funds and what it doesn’t.” (interviews 
March 2013). 
The conflict of interests around inclusiveness has created unpalatable dilemmas for donors 
between ‘hard’ objectives in the infrastructure, education and health sectors, and ‘soft’ 
objectives in the areas of socio-political participation and human rights. Many Nepalis in 
                                                 
19  The ethnic communities are divided into four main groups: Hindu Brahmin/Chhetri ‘high castes’, 
indigenous Janajaties, Madheshi peoples from the plains and Dalits (Hachhethu 2009). 
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government and academia argue that the donor community, including the EU, should 
focus less on inclusiveness as such, and more on improving the living standards of 
marginalised people. One Nepali interviewee remarked “instead of giving lots of rupees 
for constitution-building, we should invest in 100MW of hydropower” (interviews March 
2013). From the point of view of one senior government official, the EU and other donors 
are not helping Nepal create jobs but are rather supporting political processes. This view is 
also shared by several experts in the donor community, who argue that the government 
needs support in delivering peace dividends to citizens, in the form of schools, clinics, 
water treatment plants, roads and bridges, at least until there is more will to “do the soft 
stuff” (interviews March 2013). 
The EU delegation has been mostly successful at avoiding controversies, even if this has 
created the appearance of an unwillingness to accept risk. One local expert remarked that 
“the Euros have to go out the door, so the donors look for safe things to do” (interviews 
March 2013). The delegation has been wary of sensitive local governance issues and has 
preferred to engage at local level through grassroots projects. The delegation’s careful 
approach to political issues is (perhaps unsurprisingly) seen as a positive on the Nepalese 
side – government officials regard the Europeans as core development partners, while the 
Chinese, Indians and Americans are seen as less reliable and more political (interviews 
March 2013). 
Systemic factors: coordination and capacity 
Compared to other FCA countries, donor coordination in Nepal functions in a manner 
acceptable to most observers. One expert from outside the official scene described the 
main incentive as a “need for safety in numbers” (interviews March 2013). Perhaps more 
important is the Nepalese government’s capacity to coordinate donors, especially around 
the NPTF. The Nepalese government has a strong expectation that donors will honour 
their coordination commitments expressed in the 2005 Paris Declaration on aid 
effectiveness, the OECD Principles and the Busan New Deal (interviews March 2013). 
Donor coordination in Nepal is mostly organised by the UN, which hosts regular meetings 
of the International Development Partners Group and prepared the Basic Operating 
Guidelines (BOGs), a copy of which hangs on nearly every donor agency wall. The BOGs 
have been signed by the UN, the European Commission, all of the major EU bilateral 
donors, Japan, Australia, Canada and the Association of NGOs in Nepal.20 Despite the 
BOGs, some donors, such as the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and 
USAID, reportedly do their own thing, while the Asian Development Bank was described 
as ‘opaque’ by one interviewee (interviews March 2013). Several experts noted that 
USAID money is not programmed through Nepal’s country systems. The NPTF acts as a 
common forum for the government and donors. The Swiss Ambassador chairs the NPTF 
from the donor side, and has insisted that this implies a coordinating function. The donor 
community accepts the Swiss lead, as does the Nepali government. Coordination on the 
NPTF is generally regarded to be working well by both donors and Nepali government 
officials (interviews March 2013). 
                                                 
20  Some donors reportedly use the BOGs as benchmarks for deciding whether to fund politically active 
local NGOs. 
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Coordination among EU donors is close but ad hoc: the delegation works with DFID on a 
number of files, including education, elections and the NPTF. Cooperation with BMZ and 
GIZ takes place with regard to Nepal’s peacebuilding programme and technical support 
for the NPTF. Since 2010, DFID funds have supported the Commission’s contributions to 
the education sector, while DFID has received Commission funds to implement climate 
change initiatives in Nepal. (EuropeAid 2012: 101). Nepali government officials regard 
intra-EU coordination as coherent and sector-wide, especially with regard to European 
contributions to the NPTF and the EU’s role in the education sector. A further perception 
among Nepali experts is that, while the European donors are not harmonised, they do 
communicate what they are doing among each other and with local partners, and that they 
try not to compromise what other donors are doing. EU HOMs meetings are chaired by 
the EU ambassador, and the Delegation takes the lead on certain issues, such as working 
groups on human rights and elections. Switzerland and Norway also attend the EU HOMs 
meetings. The two non-EU European countries are considered ‘like-minded’ and their 
participation is welcomed by the EU Delegation. EU HOMs meetings were described as 
‘quiet’ by some officials (interviews March 2013). 
The EU Delegation in Nepal is not universally regarded as an easy partner to work with. It 
has the reputation of having lots of money but Byzantine processes. One Nepali 
interviewee remarked that it is “too hard to get a few million Euro out of them.” NGO 
staff in Kathmandu complained that information is not always clear, and demands can be 
expressed impolitely. At one project launch meeting EU officials reportedly upset several 
Nepalis present with impatient answers to questions and brusque instructions to ‘read the 
manual’ (interviews March 2013). Nepali officials nevertheless compare dealing with the 
EU Delegation to dealing with the UN, World Bank or the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), which are more useful in certain areas than smaller bilateral donors, but even less 
easy to deal with than the EU. Nepalis note that the EU system has become more 
bureaucratic since the Lisbon Treaty ended the six-month rotating presidency, although 
they can now get all of the information they need from one office. EU Delegation staff 
approach this issue with good humour, sympathising with Nepalis about how bureaucratic 
things are in Europe, and commiserating that requests and proposals take time to process 
(interviews March 2013). 
5.3  Liberia 
Background to the EU’s engagement 
Liberia is a small country of only four million people but receives a lot of attention from 
the international community. This is partly due to the driving force of Liberia’s President 
Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, who has been a prominent multilateralist and darling of the 
international community.21 The President has set Liberia the goal of being free from ODA 
within a decade and a middle income country by 2030 (USAID 2013). Liberia’s post-
conflict reconciliation and justice processes have also received a lot of Western attention, 
                                                 
21  While there is some disquiet about President Johnson-Sirleaf's appointment of her sons to key strategic 
positions, there is also a certain acceptance of her explanation that she needs people she can trust. The 
donor community is looking ahead with anxiety to the 2017 election, when Johnson-Sirleaf’s time in 
office will end. 
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particularly the arrest and ICC proceedings against former President Charles Taylor. 
International investment in Liberia has re-started, following an uncertain period around 
the 2011 elections. The World Bank notes that Liberia’s medium-term economic prospects 
are good, with a predicted annual growth rate of 7%, but the country remains vulnerable to 
external shocks (World Bank 2013a). Oil has recently been discovered and the major 
international oil companies are very interested in the country’s potential. Experts note that, 
despite the potential for a boom that would provide the country with the lift it needs, 
systems are not in place to ensure that revenues are managed equitably (interviews April 
2013). 
Liberia’s civil wars were particularly nasty and destructive. The wars are often said to 
have ‘destroyed everything except the brewery’ in a country once regarded as one Africa’s 
success stories. In such a small country, nearly everyone has personal experience of the 
violence, which left communities with deep sociological and psychological wounds that 
will take decades to heal. The security situation in the border areas towards Côte D’Ivoire 
is particularly fragile. The border itself is porous and not well controlled, and bands of 
former soldiers and mercenaries are active there. Several peacebuilding issues remain 
highly challenging, including the national reconciliation process, gender equality and land 
rights (United Nations Peacebuilding Commission to Liberia 2013). The international 
community has been reluctant to push too hard for the prosecution of alleged war 
criminals. For the EU, such prosecutions are considered part of a national reconciliation 
process that the Delegation can support, but not go beyond (interviews April 2013). 
While most experts understand the magnitude of Liberia’s challenges, many express 
frustration with the country’s sluggish progress. Ten years after the CPA, the President 
still hand-picks the holders of every important post in the country. The country’s model of 
government has not changed, dominance remains with the elites that have always had it, 
and the people who have always been poor are still poor. Most people who could leave the 
country during the wars did so, creating not only a brain drain but also a legacy of a 
divided society where elites have dual citizenship and houses in the United States, Europe 
and elsewhere in Africa. Returning Liberians with good educations often take consulting 
jobs with international donors, implementing agencies and NGOs, which pay much better 
salaries than public sector positions. As one embassy official remarked, “the middle level 
just isn’t there” (interviews April 2013).22 
Although the EU’s presence in Liberia is small compared to that of the United States and 
UN, the EU Delegation is universally regarded as a valuable partner by actors in the donor 
community, by the Liberian government and by local civil society organisations. The EU 
leads on the PRS2’s governance pillar, and focuses on support for the electoral cycle, 
support for civil society and its budget support for public financial management is widely 
praised by donors as an example of a well-functioning programme (EU Delegation to 
Liberia 2012, interviews April 2013). Several member states are also present in Liberia: 
Germany’s main interest is in infrastructure and the energy sector; France’s main interest 
is geopolitical with regard to the country’s borders with Côte D’Ivoire and Guinea. The 
                                                 
22  For poorly educated local people, there are few job opportunities. A recruitment drive by the Liberia 
army in April 2013 created queues of thousands of young men in central Monrovia, some of whom 
waited for several days to sign up. Meanwhile, the recent scandal over the failure of an entire senior 
high school year to pass the national university entrance examination is an indicator of the state of the 
education system. See ‘Liberia University to admit some failed students,’ BBC News, 27 August 2013. 
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UK contributes to the health sector pooled fund and the World Bank-administered 
infrastructure Trust fund. Sweden has the largest member state presence, focussed on 
peacebuilding support.23 
Cognitive factors: political analysis and engagement 
The EU delegation is widely considered to have excellent knowledge of the country, its 
people and its politics. EU member state officials say that they rely on the Delegation’s 
political section for information and analysis (interviews April 2013). Several 
interviewees compared meetings organised by the EU delegation to discuss conflict issues 
favourably to those organised by the UN. In particular, one member state official 
mentioned a meeting organised by the Delegation on the root causes of conflict in Liberia 
where local people were invited to discuss their concerns with the donors. The delegation 
team is regarded as engaged, sensitive and accessible. One Liberian CSO leader compared 
the Delegation’s willingness to consult with that of USAID, with whom he only ever 
meets contractors (interviews April 2013).  
EU Delegation officials also make a point of keeping abreast of developments in sectors 
that the EU is not involved in. The EU does not contribute to the Peace Building Trust 
Fund (PBTF), but delegation officials follow proceedings closely and attend most of the 
PBTF meetings. With regard to the crucial security sector reform process, the EU has not 
been involved in the Justice and Security Hubs that the Liberian government is 
establishing in regional centres to provide coordinated and decentralised security and 
justice services. But EU officials are following the hubs’ development closely in case the 
EU decides to engage. The question of whether to support them reportedly arose during 
discussions on priorities for the 11th EDF and discussions about what to support with 
state-building contracts (interviews April 2013). Other donor agency officials support an 
enhanced role for the EU in the justice sector, particularly in light of the United Nations 
Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) drawdown. Liberian government officials say that the EU’s 
contribution to the regional justice and security hubs could potentially be ‘huge’, 
especially if it were to team up with the United States in the security and justice sector 
(interviews April 2013).24 
The EU delegation sees itself first and foremost as a development actor in Liberia, rather 
than as a political player. Accordingly, its approach is to engage in policy, rather than 
political, dialogue with the Liberian government. Delegation officials say that cooperation 
                                                 
23  Spain has one diplomat in Monrovia but no development programme, while Ireland has a small Irish 
Aid office but no diplomatic representation. 
24  The hubs are considered a potential model for other fragile countries (Keane 2012). The hubs are 
presenting considerable cognitive challenges to the donor community and the Liberian government, both 
with regard to the hubs concept itself and how they will function (Sherif and Maina 2013). There are 
logistical questions related to location and access in rural areas, which can probably be resolved given 
time and experience. More difficult are the questions about how decentralised the hubs will actually be. 
There is a strong chance that the hubs will be seen as an imposition of Monrovia’s power – and by 
extension the power of the Americo-Liberian elite – on regional areas. For local chiefs, this is a serious 
issue, as they stand to lose local autonomy. A further major question is whether people from tribal areas 
will trust the hubs, given that the official justice system can be slow and inefficient, as well as alien to 
people used to traditional justice systems. There is certainly potential for the hubs to be sources of 
trouble, especially if there is a violent incident. 
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with the government is open and they do not feel there is anything that they cannot 
discuss, including good governance and human rights.25 Several interviewees from the 
international donor community (including EU member state embassies), the local NGO 
community and the Liberian government were critical of the Delegation’s approach 
because they felt the EU could have more political leverage on issues like resources, 
corruption and governance, but that the delegation’s caution limited its potential. The 
delegation does not, however, aspire to a role similar to that of the UK in Sierra Leone or 
France in the Central African Republic, where a major external actor has both a political 
agenda and a key development role in the country. In Liberia, the United States has that 
role but, according to many local and international experts, has also been reluctant to push 
it (interviews April 2013). 
Issue-related factors: conflicts of interest and trade-offs 
The EU has been very active in assisting Liberia with governance in the forestry sector, 
but the implementation of EU policies has been beset by conflicting interests. Several 
donors are concerned that reforms in the sector are going backwards. Voluntary 
Partnership Agreements (VPAs) have been ratified by the European Parliament, but the 
ratification process has not moved forward in Liberia. Policing these agreements is a 
major challenge, and timber is still being illegally exported. The Liberian justice sector 
does not have the capacity to control the sector effectively, especially with regard to 
investigating breaches and prosecuting transgressors. 
Local CSOs say that the EU has made a positive contribution in the forestry sector and 
was instrumental in bringing civil society, government and donors around the table. But 
the EU has not used its leverage to push the issue with the Parliament and Ministers 
(interviews April 2013). Since most of Liberia’s timber exports go to Asia, concerns have 
also been expressed that the EU only cares about what is being exported to Europe and not 
the whole sector (interviews April 2013). VPAs only apply to timber exported to Europe, 
although Liberian CSOs are advocating that they set the standards for domestic and other 
international markets (interviews April 2013). 
A second conflict of interest has arisen around the issue of EU support for local civil 
society organisations. Liberian civil society has an important role and is a core 
constituency for the government. Local CSO representatives say that they have learned to 
be fair and to have evidence when they challenge the government, and in doing so several 
have created space where the Government has to listen to them (interviews April 2013). 
The country has a mostly free and vibrant press and the government is generally open to 
criticism and new ideas, meaning that the potential for CSOs to make a real contribution is 
greater in Liberia than in more closed societies (Africa Governance Initiative 2013). Civil 
society organisations act as important watch-dogs: the scandal over forestry sector Private 
Use Permits (PUPs) was blown open after a CSO investigation in 2012 (Global Witness 
2012). 
Most international donor agency staff recognise that the weakness of local CSOs needs to 
be addressed and several have made this a high priority. USAID, for instance, has pledged 
                                                 
25  Political dialogue under Article 8 of the Cotonou Agreement recommenced in 2012. The follow-up 
meeting has been delayed, reportedly due to organisational difficulties on the Liberian side. 
Let’s get comprehensive: European Union engagement in fragile and conflict-affected countries 
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 31 
to provide more support for local CSOs to accept funding directly under ‘USAID 
Forward’ (USAID 2013). The EU Delegation is also well aware of the issue, which has 
been discussed extensively with local CSO leaders (interviews April 2013). The EU 
Delegation has a budget for supporting local CSOs, but some of the EU’s funding criteria, 
such as the requirement that CSOs have previously managed large projects, are too 
onerous for Liberian CSOs to access funds. The online registration process alone is 
beyond the physical capability of the Liberian internet. Standards of financial capacity and 
other criteria are set far too high for local CSOs, while delegation staff are not able to give 
feedback on proposals. In the forestry sector, delegation staff reportedly encouraged four 
local organisations to submit a joint proposal, but officials have expressed frustration that 
they cannot do more to help local CSOs (interviews April 2013). There is, however, little 
that the delegation can do about the situation. The call and proposed model for funding 
CSOs has been established by Brussels and changing any of the criteria would be a major 
task that would require ratification at various levels. 
Systemic factors: coordination and capacity 
Donor coordination in Liberia is mostly ad hoc and neither its form nor its function seems 
to satisfy anyone at the country level. Some key peacebuilding processes are not well 
coordinated, risking parallel processes. Decentralisation, the withdrawal of UNMIL and 
the Justice and Security Hubs are intrinsically linked issues but are treated separately, by 
the EU and by other donors in Liberia. Staff from several donor agencies admit that there 
are things that other donors are doing that they do not know about (interviews April 2013). 
USAID officials said that they do not have much formal interaction with the EU 
delegation and member states, and the Europeans say they do not always know what the 
Americans are planning to do. American officials say that the EU could be doing a lot 
more on organising donor collaboration (interviews April 2013). 
There is no formal forum to coordinate development cooperation, and coordination varies 
from issue to issue through technical, sector-level working groups, sometimes but not 
always including Liberian representatives. Despite intensive and fruitful cooperation on 
specific issues, the system is not structured enough to have an impact at the political level. 
Donor country officials say that the Liberian public sector is difficult to coordinate with: 
The Liberian Ministry of Finance asks donors for a quarterly report, and donors can meet 
with the ministry, but it is the President’s office that takes the main decisions. Some donor 
agency officials put this down to the weakness of the Liberian government but say that the 
onus to improve is on the donor community, because “this is what they do for a living and 
the Liberian government doesn’t know what it looks like” (interviews April 2013). There 
is a need for more donor coordination around strengthening the capacity of the Liberian 
government and administration. USAID’s ‘Human and Institutional Capacity 
Development’ programme has several initiatives operating and there have been efforts to 
coordinate this with EU, Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) 
and World Bank capacity development initiatives. Country-level donor agency staff say 
that programmes are often distracted by minor things, like ministerial re-organisations and 
payroll issues (interviews April 2013). 
The EU has a large budget in Liberia and many believe that it could and should play a 
more prominent role. Indeed, Liberia is an unusual case for the EU in that there is no 
member state that is a former colonial power and who runs the show, and member state 
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presences are very small.26 One member state official noted that the EU cannot do 
anything unless it has a mandate, but for certain aspects of coordination it does not need 
one. The official pointed out that the EU Delegation has 12 diplomats and several other 
staff, and it could increase its efforts in organising lower-level coordination meetings, for 
instance among administrative staff on issues like payment levels for local staff and so on 
(interviews April 2013). Few coordination meetings take place below the HOMs level, 
partly because EU Delegation officials are aware of the lack of member state capacity and 
try to limit the number of meetings and exercises they ask the member state 
representations to get involved in. 
EU joint programming for Liberia has reportedly been postponed in the short term, 
although the potential for a joint EU country strategy has been noted (Hacking and 
Gerbrandij 2013). Country level officials point out that joint programming needs further 
discussion at headquarters level, partly because of the challenge of synchronising 
programmes and projects, but also because several member states do not have sufficient 
time horizons. The magnitude of the coordination task at the country level and the 
difficulty of coordinating the EU exercise with the Liberian government were also 
mentioned as factors. A further reason was that the programming process for the 11th EDF 
was already well advanced when joint programming came on to the table, and nobody 
wanted to start the process again (interviews April 2013). For now, a joint document based 
on the national development strategy is planned as of 2017, and Norway and Switzerland 
will be part of the exercise. 
6 Conclusions 
The EU clearly possesses strengths as an external actor engaging with fragile states and 
situations. Its size means it has diplomatic weight and the ability to engage in several 
countries and crises at once, which its member states acting individually cannot do to the 
same extent. Its instruments enable it to support the entire peacekeeping/peace-
building/statebuilding process, and it can address various priorities – security, diplomatic, 
or economic – at key times. The European institutions carry less historical baggage than 
member states and people in the countries where they work often say that they have fewer 
reasons to suspect the EEAS’ or the Commission’s motives. The EU has built a strong 
international reputation as an effective humanitarian actor and it has valuable expertise in 
the governance area. Its longer budget cycles and willingness to use budget support in 
risky environments potentially provide partner-country systems with predictable and 
valuable support. Although there are limits to how far its relevance stretches beyond 
Europe, the experience that European countries went through in building domestic and 
supranational institutions following World War II and the Cold War can both inspire and 
instruct efforts to build state authority, capacity and legitimacy elsewhere. The EU and its 
delegations have made and are making positive contributions to peacebuilding, 
statebuilding and socio-economic development in all three of the case countries explored 
in this paper. 
                                                 
26  The lack of EU member state capacity, and EU delegation mandate, to process Schengen visas for 
Liberians has become a major issue. Liberians have to fly to Abidjan or Accra – a trip that costs time 
and money. This issue has been raised by Liberians in various forums, including by President Johnson-
Sirleaf personally. 
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As discussed in this paper, three types of challenge that intervene between the policy and 
operations levels undermine the EU’s effectiveness and potential to support FCA countries 
through their peacebuilding and statebuilding processes. Evidence from the EU’s 
engagements in South Sudan, Nepal and Liberia suggest that these challenges interact to 
create a multidimensional policy-operations gap. This gap has proved very difficult to 
close, not least because the EU (and most other international actors in FCA countries) do 
not conceptualise these challenges or try to deal with them in a constructive and 
comprehensive manner. Indeed, many issues – especially those requiring trade-offs – are 
avoided or worked around for fear of the fall-out that may occur if they are faced honestly. 
These findings have important implications for policy debates on international 
engagement in FCA countries. While the risk-averse approach (or the path of least 
resistance) is certainly the right one in many instances, more care to limit the creation of 
future moral hazard situations needs to be taken. Meanwhile, focus on the partner-
country’s socio-economic development must be maintained, even if there are times when 
other priorities appear to override this. 
Cognitive factors 
In all three case countries, officials at the headquarters level in Brussels and the member 
states are very well informed and understand (as well as outsiders can understand) the 
domestic politics of the country. They are also aware of the strategic implications of the 
country’s politics and the significance of this for the EU, its member states, non-EU 
donors, key external actors such as the United States or China, and for the country’s 
neighbours. They are also aware of the sometimes delicate politics among EU donors 
around the intervention itself. Knowledge management is an issue, and institutional 
memory can be lost through staff rotation at both country and headquarters level, but as a 
rule new officials are well briefed and do not take long to come up to speed. 
However, understanding the nature of a problem does not mean that an appropriate 
solution is available and can be quickly implemented. Moreover, although in FCA 
countries, local knowledge is essential, uncertainty cannot be eliminated entirely – many 
experts acknowledge that it is sometimes impossible to know in advance if an initiative is 
going to work. Often, the main cognitive issue is not the lack of knowledge itself, but 
difficulties in translating knowledge into effective programmes and projects that address 
specific problems and are adaptable enough for when circumstances change, as they 
inevitably do in FCA countries. 
While the criticism that the EU’s approach to fragile states is ‘too technocratic’ and 
neglects political-economy factors at the heart of conflicts is easy to make, the issue is 
more complex. Many of the tasks that the EU undertakes in fragile states are of a technical 
nature, from organising service provision to monitoring elections to providing know-how 
on institutional design. Furthermore, the consequences of a more politicised engagement 
also need consideration. While external actors need to be aware of sensitive political 
issues in a conflict-affected country, and of whether their actions are harmful, they must 
also be very careful about attempting to influence the politics of a country, especially if 
this involves taking sides. Getting too close to a partner-country’s politics risks the 
legitimacy of the engagement and any political settlement that emerges. While the EU and 
its delegations have been reasonably successful in maintaining a balance between 
‘political’ and ‘technocratic’ approaches in all three case countries studied for this paper, 
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the tensions that arose around European donor support for ethnic and caste inclusiveness 
in Nepal serve as a reminder that the balance is a delicate one. 
Issue-related factors 
Conflicts of interest sometimes prevent the EU and the delegation from acting on 
something that officials consider they should act on. There are two main types of conflict 
of interest that arise to greater or lesser extents in all three case countries: the first are 
conflicts between the EU’s preferences for peacebuilding and statebuilding in accordance 
with internationalist institutional and governance norms, and partner government/elite 
preferences for how they want to solidify their position (and sometimes their genuine 
conviction about what they believe is in the best interests of their country). The second are 
intra-EU conflicts of interest around the role of the EU vis-à-vis member states. In both 
cases most actors are aware of the need for trade-offs and, at the country level, a pragmatic 
approach that tries to avoid clashes and make the most of opportunities is taken. 
There are major questions around the issue of ownership in all three cases. All three 
partner governments regard the EU as a valuable partner but are reluctant to own what the 
EU is doing in their countries. This is especially the case in South Sudan, where the SPLM 
has proved ready to delay the delivery of a peace dividend to its people while relying on 
donors to pay salaries and provide basic services. In Nepal, cooperation on the NPTF has 
worked well, but the EU has been caught up in controversies around support for 
inclusiveness programmes that are not in the interests of established elites. In Liberia, 
relationships have been easier and discussions more open but, as in the other two cases, 
the EU has taken a risk-averse approach to trade-offs. 
At the intra-EU level, difficulties arise in reconciling member state preferences for 
bilateral policy with a greater role for the Commission and the EEAS. Intra-EU conflicts 
mean that there may not be a clear European position, or that differing member state 
positions may undermine what the EU delegation is trying to, either with the partner 
government or with the wider donor community. This kind of situation can be exacerbated 
by the complexity of a fragile situation and the difficulty of charting a coherent course 
through it. The experience of the South Sudan joint programming exercise indicates that 
EU member states are not yet ready to empower the EU delegations to act on their behalf 
or even to coordinate their activities. This position is consistent with EU subsidiarity 
principles, and, as indicated by the cautious approach of the EU delegations in Nepal and 
Liberia, is respected by EU-level agencies even in countries where national interests do 
not appear to be at stake. 
System-related factors 
The standard of donor coordination varied among the three countries and between sectors 
at the country level. In all three cases, officials lamented the state of donor coordination, 
although it was clearly more developed in Nepal than in the two African cases. In all three 
cases, efforts are being made to improve the situation. Donor coordination was not as 
dysfunctional as it is often made out to be in any of the three countries – in all three there 
are functioning mechanisms. These are, nevertheless, sector-specific and tend to not be in 
politically sensitive sectors. 
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Three factors stood out with regard to coordination: 
- First, country-level officials often blamed the poor capacity of the partner 
government for lack of coordination. This is certainly an important factor – 
coordination works better when the government is able to coordinate donors, as 
was evident to some extent in Nepal, and is shown more clearly in countries like 
Rwanda. However, it is somewhat disingenuous for donors to blame poor partner-
country capacity for their own coordination difficulties. Donors (including EU 
donors) are not working hard enough to coordinate their own programmes and 
projects (a process that is highly transaction cost-intensive), and they are not doing 
enough to support increased partner-country capacity, both through the use of 
national systems and through technical assistance to improve those systems. In 
South Sudan and Liberia especially, much could be achieved through greater 
investment in computer literacy courses and other basic skills training. 
- Second, country-level officials are well aware of the limits of coordination and 
tend to take a very pragmatic approach. Coordination efforts are kept as simple as 
possible and are made when opportunities arise. Coordination meetings can be 
extremely time consuming. Those meetings that take place tend to be on the level 
of exchange of information, but there are many instances where donors say that 
they do not know what others are doing. 
- Third, the role of the EU delegation in coordinating the activities of other EU 
donors is limited. The Lisbon Treaty lifted the profile and increased the mandates 
and capacity of the delegations, but this is only slowly materialising into a central 
coordinating role. This is partly due to the pragmatic choice to not challenge 
member state primacy (the delegations’ mandate to do this is not clear or widely 
accepted anyway, including by the delegations themselves), partly due to 
pragmatic recognition of the limits of possibility, and partly due to capacity 
constraints at the delegation level. 
The three countries studied exhibited some interesting variations that may provide some 
insights as to models of EU donor coordination in FCA countries: in South Sudan, the 
delegation had a central role conveyed by joint programming but was unable to exercise it 
completely, due to ambiguous member state buy in, changing circumstances, and weak 
engagement from the South Sudanese. The UK, in particular, has acted as a brake on EU 
ambitions in South Sudan. In Nepal, the EU delegation is integrated into a more broadly 
‘European’ donor coordination, with the Swiss and (to a lesser extent) DFID at the centre. 
This system works reasonably well, not least because of the greater capacity and 
professionalism of the Nepalese bureaucracy. In Liberia the absence of a large member 
state has created space for a greater coordinating role by the delegation. EU member states 
and other donors say that they want the EU to do more. This opportunity does not, 
however, appear to have been fully taken up by the EU. 
There are important conclusions for the role that the EU delegations are likely to play in 
the EU’s efforts to develop its ‘comprehensive approach’ to peacebuilding and 
statebuilding in FCA countries. In most cases, the EU delegation is the logical centrepiece 
of more closely coordinated EU and member state operations at the country level 
involving a wide range of policy tools and instruments. Although it receives its mandate 
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from member states and is wary of mixing in policy areas that member governments feel 
are their own preserve, there is a sense that the EEAS and the Commission have been 
overly cautious about pushing for a stronger coordinating role. Working together, there is 
much that the EEAS and the Commission could do to carve out a more central role for the 
EU and its delegations that member states and other international actors could line up 
behind. 
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